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JUNE 1962

THE US ROLE IN WESTERN EUROPE: PROTRACTED
WAR/SHORT WAR QUESTION

by

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE US ROLE IN WESTERN EUROPE; PROTRACTED
WAR/SHORT WAR QUESTION

BY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

11

ABSTRACT

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This group research project contends that the US and the USSR are presently involved in a political and economic war. The project further establishes that the US and USSR are also major competitors at the military level. The Soviet threat to the United States is examined in three areas: economics, politics, and the military. Data was gathered by personal interviews with US and foreign military officers at SHAPE; representatives from strategic research institutes in London and Stockholm; and with US diplomats and Swedish government officials in Stockholm. Academicians and military officials at the USAWC were also queried. An analysis was made of the possibilities of a short war or a protracted war within Western Europe. The question as to whether the Soviets will attack and the "better moment" when they might attack is also addressed. The driving political issues plus the economic factors which may lead to a military confrontation in Western Europe are also presented.

The Soviet government is currently beset with uncertainty as to which domestic and foreign policy options to choose. The US must strive for a sound NATO Alliance which can continue to deter the USSR. Containment must become a co-equal to NATO's policy of "flexible response."



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This project identifies events which are reality and which may portend the future of a European confrontation. War, as depicted by Webster, is "The state or fact of exerting violence or force against a state or other politically organized body."¹

Carl von Clausewitz complements this definition in that, "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means."²

In the first definition by Webster, the authors concentrate on the quality of "exerting violence or force against a state or other politically organized body" and recognize the key to this definition as "exerting violence or force." This particular excerpt when combined with Clausewitz's belief that "war is a continuation of policy with other means," formulates the premise of this study that the United States and the Soviet Union are presently engaged in "exerting force," through, "a continuation of policy by other means."

The Clausewitzian "policies" of question are "politics" and "economics" with the dictum of Webster's "violence" represented by the "military threat" and impending possibility of a military confrontation.

An explanation of the economics, politics involved, and the military threat are presented with specifics involving each area. The research conducted by the authors has concentrated on identifying those

areas which can best explain the question of this project, "Will there be a protracted war/short war in Europe?"

Definition

Protracted War/Short War. Time plays a capricious role in establishing a specific protracted war/short war definition. Regimentation, mobilization, war reserves and a host of structured activities also play a role in determining the parameters of a "protracted war/short war."

The USSR chooses to identify the dissimilarities between the two durations by stating, "The main difference between a short and a long war is that the former is principally fought by existing forces using resources that are immediately available."³

This particular viewpoint thoroughly complements "the come as you are theme," which is popularly used by U.S. Military Strategists. In addition, the Soviet description also complements their overwhelming reliance on a "surprise" theme which permeates their entire military strategy. Frequent Warsaw Pact exercises always prompt border activities on both sides of the frontier. One can never be sure if it is only a practice military exercise or an actual confrontation. Although they do not specifically identify an element of time, the inference of "using forces that are immediately available" implies a duration of only days and a few weeks at most.

The War Powers Act provides the President with the capability to invoke a "Presidential Call-up," which also serves as a possible definition for a protracted war/short war. This mobilization level states in part, "The President may augment the active forces by a call-up of units of the selected reserve up to 155,000 men for up to 90 days to meet the requirements of an operational mission."⁴ This authorization identifies

a specific length of time plus the size of the force. Although the next mobilization level, which is identified as "partial," includes Congress in its declaration, its description and all subsequent levels of mobilization complement a protracted war scenario more than a short one.

General Maxwell Taylor, using slightly different semantics, describes the two confrontations as a "general war/limited war."

A general war would be a direct armed conflict involving the United States and the Communist bloc in which our national survival would be at stake. In a conflict of such magnitude it is probable that weapons of all sizes would be used with few limitations. It is depicted as an atomic fight to the finish by the two great power blocs.⁵

If this concept of general war is accepted, the definition of limited war then becomes relatively simple, it is any military conflict short of a general war, one in which our national existence is not at stake. Thus, "limited war covers a wide range of military operations, from a patrol action to armed combat on the magnitude of the Korean War or greater."⁶

General Taylor's perspective creates an entirely different viewpoint for the definition. The element of time plays an interesting role with the "general war . . . in which our national survival would be at stake," creating a variety of scenarios in which the longevity of the confrontation could be extremely short or long. The limited war which extends itself from a "patrol action . . . to combat on the magnitude of the Korean War," creates an unpredictable scenario for the element of time. The key difference being the level of threat, a threat which would endanger our national survival. A threat to Europe economically, politically or militarily, is a threat to the national security of the United States.

Numerous other viewpoints incorporate a variety of times, durations

and involvements. A personal visit by the authors to several international organizations and institutes in London, and Stockholm and to SHAPE in Mons Belgium have assisted in articulating a short war - protracted war definition. Their remarks are as follows:

Sverre Lodgaard, a Norwegian research fellow from the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), "Warsaw Pact countries would have a great deal of difficulty sustaining a short war, let alone a long war due to their economic difficulties."⁷ The concern that an inadequate economy might influence the length of a war, could also serve as the cause for a war.

Miss Jenonne Walker, Counselor for Political Affairs, Embassy of the United States of America, Stockholm, "Sweden feels that Europe is stabilized with Third World Nations providing the greatest source of conflict, they do not forecast an East-West nuclear war, particularly on Swedish soil."⁸ Sweden does not foresee a confrontation, yet their perspective is countered with a civil defense program which has provided fall out shelters for 63% of their population. Once again, the element of a "threat to one's national security" is obviously inferred, if not implied.

Nils Gylden, Chairman, Security Policy and Long Range Planning, Defense Secretariat, Sweden:

A short war would not include a nuclear confrontation, the war would have limited objectives, limited operations and move very rapidly for only a few months. If nuclear weapons are used, the confrontation will be of a fairly short duration, with a long time required to re-establish society. The length of time for a short war will be less than half a year but more than a few weeks. The higher the level of conventional violence, the shorter the war. Limited violence could go on for an extended period of time. A war could be short and long at the same time; attack, drawback, rest and then conflict again; this sequence could go on for years.⁹

Mr. Gylden, and his committee members, provided a wide variety of

reflections, all of which complement the definition. The quote, "The higher the level of conventional violence, the shorter the war," is a unique thought and certainly worthy of additional consideration. If conventional forces are to become a deterrence in Europe, then parity of East-West forces leads to a higher level of possible violence; conversely, the lower the level of conventional forces becomes, the more the situation is depreciated.

Brigadier General Dr. Franz L. Uhle-Wettler, German Army, Plans and Policy (PANP) Division, SHAPE, "A short war will take place when the other side cannot mobilize its resources, a long war is a confrontation which allows the other side to mobilize and make decisive gains in attaining its industrial potential."¹⁰ General Uhle-Wettler certainly complements the "come as you are" theory. He further stated that, "A short war will be less than six months long."¹¹

Col. Michael E. Sharpe, United Kingdom, PANP, SHAPE, "Conventional shortages preclude a long war, with the lack of conventional force structure causing overwhelm and ultimately, nuclear war."¹² Again, economics or their "lack of presence, or stability" serves as a viable definition.

Col. Jonathan Alford, Deputy Director, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) London, "There is presently a state of conflict, but not war, war is denial of detente."¹³ Col. Alford's views about detente represent a strong European opinion that detente is and can still work. Conversely, this opinion is not shared by many Americans. However, Col. Alford does concede that there is a state of conflict between the USSR and the U.S.; however, semantics preclude it from being raised above the level of "conflict."

As a result of the previous discussions, the authors have created a definition which best captures the theme of this project to include an embodiment of the greatest majority of opinions expressed:

Short War: (could include one or all three elements)

1. Would not exceed those forces on active duty, but could include a mobilization augmentation authorized by a "Presidential Call-up."
2. The confrontation would be experienced by existing forces.
3. The confrontation would not be a threat to the national survival of the United States.

Protracted War: (could include one or both elements)

1. Any confrontation which involves a mobilization greater than a "Presidential Call-up," and the forces at hand.
2. Any confrontation which would be a threat to the national survival of the United States.

An obvious area of concern for the reader might be the lack of a time reference or a nuclear/chemical involvement. However, the mobilization level provides a length of time indicator while the use of nuclear and chemical weapons could logically be used in either definition without altering their intent. If a nuclear exchange took place in Europe, the U.S. would immediately mobilize at a high level of mobilization, the confrontation would immediately become protracted, regardless of the number of actual military confrontations.

It is difficult for the authors to perceive a war in Europe which would not be a threat to the national survival of the United States. The subsequent chapters will attempt to qualify this viewpoint.

CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES

1. Websters New International Dictionary, (Cambridge, Mass., G. and C. Merriam Co., 1959) p. 962.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976) p. 69.

3. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979) p. 12.

4. Abbott A. Brayton, "American Mobilization Policies for the 1980s," RUSI, March 1981, p. 27.

5. Opinion expressed by General Maxwell D. Taylor in an address ("Improving Our Capabilities for Limited War") at the thirty-fifth annual session of the Institute of World Affairs at the Huntington-Sheraton Hotel, Pasadena, California, 8 December 1958.

6. Ibid.

7. Statement by Sverre Lodgaard, Military Analyst at SIPRI, personal interview, Stockholm, Sweden, 22 April 1982.

8. Statement by Miss Jenonne Walker, Political Advisor, U.S. Embassy, Stockholm, Sweden, personal interview, 22 April 1982.

9. Statement by Nils Gylden, member Swedish Defense Secretariat, Swedish Defense Department, personal interview, Stockholm, Sweden, 23 April 1982.

10. Statement by Brig. Gen. Uhle-Wettler, German Army, Plans and Policy Division, SHAPE, personal interview, Mons, Belgium, 18 April 1982.

11. Ibid.

12. Statement by Col. Sharpe, United Kingdom, Plans and Policy Division, SHAPE, personal interview, Mons, Belgium, 18 April 1982.

13. Statement by Col. Alford, Deputy Director, International Institute of Strategic Studies, personal interview, London, England, 16 April 1982.

CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION

The Economic Impact

In addressing economic factors which affect the East-West relationship in western Europe, it is essential to discuss those areas which will have the greatest impact on upsetting the precarious balance of two world superpowers. Both sides are struggling with not only what should be done economically, but how to achieve their goals once they have been determined.

Both sides are besieged by suspicion of economic objectives, trade imbalances, energy resources, and rising East debts to the West. All of these place a tremendous strain on economic stability. Tied closely with these economic issues, is the political involvements with non-aligned or third-world countries by both powers.

Several questions result from an analysis of Soviet economic objectives and the ramifications of these objectives. For example: What is the purpose of Soviet economic policy? Are the Soviets attempting to gain economic footholds in western Europe? Do they have a plan to achieve an economic stronghold on the West in the area of critical energy and minerals? Are they using economic policies to enhance their power projection throughout the world? Can economic issues bring about armed hostilities?

Sun Tzu in 500 B.C. stated that the "supreme excellence consists of breaking the will of the enemy's resistance without fighting."¹ What better way to achieve this than through economic means? The Soviets are presently embarked on achieving their avowed international revolution utilizing economic tools as an important element in furthering Soviet influence.

Lenin wrote, "we are now exercising our main influence on the international revolution through economic policy,"² which establishes a direct link between their foreign policy and progress of the socialist economy. By implementing the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress concerning the development of the national economy and by making preparations for the next Congress, or the 26th of May 1982, the Soviet Union is making a growing contribution to strengthen their positions of world socialism and effecting a further change in the balance of power in the world in favor of socialism.³

Economic issues play an important part in the Soviets grand strategy for advancing the cause of world socialism. Lester Thurow commented in a recent article that "those who worry about Soviet adventurism in the window of relative U.S. Military weakness in the mid-1980s ought to have nightmares about Soviet adventurism in the window of relative American economic weakness in the 1990s."⁴

The Soviets domestic economic problems place them in a difficult position. They may be forced into a lessening of emphasis on defense spending or into an external mode to divert attention away from domestic problems. More than one war had among its factors the determined use of economic leverage. For example, a U.S. embargo on Japan was an important factor behind Japan's attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941.⁵

These external threats do not need to be accomplished by the Soviet

Union in solo, but may be achieved through a proxy or through arms transfer and security assistance. They must, however, "rely on force to achieve their international objectives precisely as a result of their economic and social failures."⁶

This can be demonstrated by the use of Soviet surrogates in the Mid-East and Africa. Brezhnev is reportedly have told Mohammed Siad Bane, president of Somali, in 1973: "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends: the energy treasure of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure of Central and southern Africa."⁷ Some would question whether or not Brezhnev did make such a statement. However, a study of these areas reveals a picture of Soviet activities which strongly indicate that these aims are in fact being put into effect to accomplish control over these areas. If they are successful, the West will be placed in a precarious situation to say the least. Can we afford to discount such an ominous signal?

As J. Fagg Foster stated: "We are emerging into a positive formulation of our own. Let us think carefully, and above all, honestly, lest we make a mistake. For a mistake at this juncture may last a very long time."⁸

The Soviet economy during the sixties showed a substantial growth rate. However, in recent years, the Soviet economic growth rate has slowed to a snails-pace. Living standards have declined in the USSR. Poland is in economic chaos with other Warsaw Pact countries following close behind. This is not to say that the Soviet Union is approaching economic collapse, since they have sufficient natural resources and control to stave off such an occurrence. However, the economic stagnation will force fundamental political decisions and create unique opportunities and dangers for the

West.

Where then, can we say the Soviets are headed in their power projection utilizing economic means? Some leading American businessmen believe that the Russians have hit on a new, immensely effective technique for crippling western industrial production. This involves cutting off the source of critical materials which relied on heavily by the West as imports.⁹ Frank Shakespeare, former director of the United States Information Agency and now president of RKO General, Inc., said: "We have got ourselves a problem. When we jostle with Western Europe and Japan for strategic minerals - that's competition. When the Russians get into the act - that's war."¹⁰ Perhaps, if the U.S. were to perceive the U.S.S.R. as an economic competitor, our competition would be a little more spirited and a little less tense. The U.S. has always thrived on competition in this arena and through successful trading relations, break any apparent strangleholds.

East-West Trade

There can be little doubt that the Soviets have made substantial progress in their efforts to obtain high technology from the West and then copy the newly acquired products. Additionally, by developing economic relations with the West, the eastern bloc countries can fulfill a variety of economic objectives. Included are the purchase or theft of technological advances to save time and money, the import of minerals and agricultural raw materials in limited supply, the involvement in the economic turnover of unused resources to provide a source of hard currency, the use of the world market reserve function for covering temporary deficits or selling relative surpluses of individual products, and the implementation of several projects of a regional or inter-

regional nature.¹¹

In recent years the Soviet union has enhanced its power projection capability with the high technology transfers obtained from the West. This advance has been carried out in part by the naivety, apathy, or suspectability of the NATO Alliance and western countries. In a recent article, Casper W. Weinberger stated that "the Soviets have organized a massive, systematic effort to get advanced technology from the West. The purpose of this is to support the Soviet military buildup."¹²

During the last two decades the Soviets moved quickly to acquire "civilian" electronic technology by setting up several specialized electronic factories which are today operated as classified facilities. If they cannot acquire the desired equipment openly then they utilize clandestine means, such as bribery of western scientists, engineers, and businessmen; utilization of diplomatic and official visits to glean needed information; surrogate corporations to buy equipment for the USSR; exploitation of neutral and third-world countries; and finally, covert intelligence operations of the KGB. All of these measures result in billions of dollars saved in research and development costs and at the same time an appreciable enhancement of the Soviets power projection potential.¹³

Traditionally the West has relied strongly on a "quality-edge" in equipment to stabilize the East-West balance of power. Some efforts have been made by the West to limit the Soviets access to high technology transfer. The United States, in particular, has been the leader in such a movement with varying degrees of participation by other western aligned countries. At the Ottawa Summit Conference in July 1981, President Reagan appealed to our allies to tighten the international control system.¹⁴

Even though the West has the International Control System (COCOM) to safeguard technology, most of the participants do not allow defense specialists to review the proposed transfer of technology. Only the U.S. and France utilize these type of experts. The results are that several civilian items have enhanced the Soviet military preparedness. An example would be the highly advanced communication switching equipment which ended up adding greatly to the Soviets command and control capabilities.

Lawrence J. Brady, Assistant Commerce Secretary, warned again the prediction of Lenin's "that the capitalists would gladly sell the rope with which they would be hung."¹⁵

There continues to be the two divergent forces — military considerations and economic factors which drive East-West trade in the area of technology transfer. Another example of the imbalance was pointed out when William D. Carey, publisher, of Science magazine, published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, protested the Pentagon's allegation that the Soviets had exploited scientific exchanges to enhance their military power. Mr. Frank Carlucci, Deputy Defense Secretary, replied with five columns of documentation to include an example of a Soviet exchange student taking a course in a U.S. university taught by a professor who was a U.S. Navy consultant on fuel-air explosives. After taking the course, the Soviet student returned to the USSR and began working on developing fuel-air explosives.¹⁶

Another area of vital concern to East-West trade has been agriculture. In fact, agriculture has been the Soviets most intractable failure. Poor soil, erratic rainfall, and a short growing season contribute

to the fact that they suffer one bad harvest out of every three. However, their incentive practices play a major role. A graphic illustration is that 3% of the Soviet population grows 24 to 30% of the total agricultural output on private family plots. Counter this with the fact that 30% of the total work force produces the remaining 75% and one begins to appreciate the economic incompetence of the Soviet governments agricultural program. The 1963 grain harvest was a disaster and caused the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev. In 1965, Leonid Brezhnev introduced enormous increases in outlays for machinery, construction, fertilizers, and land reforms with the result that by 1977, annual agricultural investment ran to nearly \$80 billion, more than six times the U.S. expenditures.¹⁷ Even with these massive infusions, the Soviets have relied on large grain imports to supplement their domestic harvests every year since 1971. These imports — to feed beef cattle, chickens, and hogs — are a major cause of relative stability of Soviet consumption in the Brezhnev era. The potential impact of agricultural failures has been softened by these grain imports paid for by oil exports and by selling vast quantities of gold — 224 tons in 1981 alone.¹⁸ Regarding the Soviets third crop failure in a row, Marshall Goldman, associate director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard stated, "the Soviet Union finds itself with a disaster of unprecedented magnitude on its hands."¹⁹

Almost a quarter of the Soviet work force is in agriculture and they still cannot feed their nation. Contrast this to only three percent of the labor force in America is in agriculture and they produce a surplus. Each American farmer feeds 60 people; each Soviet farmer feeds only eight! The only area of USSR agriculture that produces is the small private sector already mentioned.²⁰

In conclusion, the main imports from the West in recent years have been agricultural products (especially grain) and technology (in the form of capital goods, licenses, and know-how). These two categories formed about half of all currency imports in 1978-79 alone. By and large, the effective constraint on the Soviets has been the hard currency balance of payments. Additionally, the East European countries are experiencing economic stagnation with shortages of basic materials and a staggering hard currency debt of 60 billion dollars with no improvement in sight.

There is little doubt that the Soviets will continue to attempt to obtain technological advances from the West. Further, they will continue to utilize the traditional methods of buying if they can, stealing if they must, but always covertly to enhance their power projection capabilities.

A continuing area of concern is agriculture. With the third crop failure in a row and the potential situation in Argentina, the Soviets may be faced with some ominous decisions with respect to the shortages of agricultural products. Their alternatives are even more constrained by the hard currency problems and by the continued draw on the Soviet economy in the area of support to devastated East European economies.

In 1976, a serious grain failure was in concert with an intrusion into Angola, in 1979 a profound grain failure was followed by the invasion of Afghanistan. One cannot help but wonder, since in 1981 the Soviets experienced their greatest crop failure in a decade, what will be their source of distraction this time; Poland, Berlin, Central America?

Energy Resources

The recent awareness of an energy shortage throughout the world has caused a significant shift in strategic thinking in both the western and eastern bloc countries. Suddenly there is the realization that not only will energy cost more but that the availability and source of energy is a prime consideration in the world arena.

The bulk of the western European needs for oil comes from the Persian Gulf, whereas, the U.S. only imports approximately ten percent of its total need from this same region.

Western Europe presently imports 88% of its oil. The Persian Gulf is a major influence on Europe, and whatever influences Europe, indirectly influences the United States. "In Amsterdam, Meindert van der Zee's up to date economic forecast is that Europe's recession will continue indefinitely if it isn't interrupted by war."²¹

Although Mr. van der Zee's opinion is formulated by his "construction tradesmen mindset" and does not represent the European norm, his opinion is drawn from a similar bleak economic condition that immediately preceded the 1914 and 1939 conflicts. The significance of the present recession is that western Europe's present sagging economy stems largely from the first oil price shock in 1974. Every nation that relied on imported oil suffered, unfortunately, western Europe never fully recovered.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has to make one wonder if the USSR's grand design isn't to move a little closer to the spigot controlling the European industrial lifeline.

In a recent interview at SHAPE, Brig. Gen. Uhle-Wettler, German Army, very aptly described the precarious situation in the Persian Gulf, "Middle Eastern oil is a fat lamb just outside the cave of a big bear,

never in history has a big power resisted in taking a fat lamb."²²

If the Soviet Union does exercise its advantage and pursue its "fat lamb" in the Middle-East; under present conditions, European industry would be forced to capitulate to Soviet economic demands.

However, there are other options. Of 3.6 million holes drilled in the surface of the earth, three out of every four are found in the United States surface. Exploration of Europe's has been thorough. Sub-surface exploration reveals that there is much to be yet discovered. Recent findings show that if western Europe would increase its production rates in the North Sea, it could depreciate its oil dependency from 80% to 60% by 1985-90.

Granted, a \$30 billion investment is a monumental task, but which is worse, investing two or three times as much or becoming dependent on a Russian pipeline at a cost of \$10 to \$15 billion. A strong selling point is the fact "the investment would have a four year payback at the prices the Europeans will be paying for Russian gas."²³

The United States will continue to resist the Russian gas pipeline into Europe. Oil is a natural resource which is not a depleted commodity; it is, however, a precious resource which hasn't been adequately exploited. "There will be no shortage of energy in all forms until at least the next ice age. Oil and gas may go the way of the sperm oil, but probably without disastrous impact, and even this isn't likely for another century."²⁴

Oil is not the only natural resource which is a precious commodity. However, in each and every situation, the USSR either has quantities in abundance, is exercising influence, or has surrogates who are in a position to control the commodity. Specific inorganic minerals are a

subject of themselves, however, the Soviet Union is actively pursuing its goal of controlling "the treasure chests" of the West. Obviously, there is much to be stated about this particular subject which hasn't been addressed by the author. However, the fact remains that the choices for western Europe and the United States are not good, particularly for West Europe. But despite the hazards involved, it would appear to be unrealistic to expect the European market to foresake the potential of increasing its source of natural resources. The only stimulus that they will respond to is a more lucrative market provided by a better salesman. Perhaps it's time that the U.S. entertained a corporate petroleum industry in the North Sea?

Completion of the Russian pipeline will definitely prove to be an economic victory for Russia. It will dramatically increase their crude capacity which is needed to provide a petroleum surge in the event war does take place and, at the very least, it will provide the hard currency that they need to sponsor their illegitimate activities throughout the world.

Rising East-West Debts to the West

Grim warnings about shaky debts owed to western banks has prompted an authority in Zurich to remark that "it is the most serious threat to financial and economic stability since the Great Depression."²⁵

Countries with serious problems are not exclusively found in the Warsaw Pact. Argentina owes in excess of \$38 billion and has created a dramatic smoke screen to distract her population. One can only hope that similar events do not emanate from the East European countries.

Without a doubt, one of the greatest economic debates in this century centers around the controversy of whether to default on Warsaw

Pact bank payments or to continue to extend credit.

On one hand, a large contingent of Americans feel that the U.S. should stand up to the Warsaw Pact governments and assist their dissidents in regaining their economic and political freedom. While another viewpoint contends that the \$60 billion or more of net hard currency credits that have been extended to Warsaw Pact Nations are worth much more than their face value in terms of political advantage.

Although it is difficult to specifically prove, dissidence has thrived at a higher level than has been experienced in the past. Solidarity is, a matter of fact, that has not disappeared and is still showing signs of life within Poland. Economics is probably the only viable leverage that the U.S. can provide on the Warsaw Pact governments. Past efforts to provide sanctions on the Soviet Union and her allies has provided minimal acceptance and support by West European nations. A default of payments would also release the outstanding obligations which the USSR is presently covering. In addition, a default would affect western banks more than it would the country failing to pay the loan. How can their credit be ruined any more than it presently has?

"Now" seems to be a logical time to tie political favors with economic desires. By tying arms reduction with economic business, the attention of the USSR may be more attentive than it has been in the past. The greatest difficulty in the past is that the USSR under the guise of detente proved to be a much shrewder negotiator and trader. If default is to be called, the USSR must do it. Detente is still an open subject with the Europeans still singing its praises. Nils Gylden, from the Defense Secretariat of Sweden, pointed out, "West Europe has the capability to balance the USSR on its own, if it chooses to do

so.²⁶ Default will not be accepted by the European nations unless it comes about as a result of a Warsaw Pact declaration. Involvement of the U.S. in declaring an East European bankruptcy could prove to be an overwhelming challenge to the strength of the NATO alliance.

Western lenders need to be extremely cautious and wary of East European loans. By allowing the draw down of their own hard currency, they have dramatically stifled their own domestic lending capabilities. This in turn has to have some impact on the present economic crisis being experienced throughout the western world.

One has to wonder if the present disparity in East-West loans is a result of careless business practices or a deliberately executed plan to weaken the monetary reserves of the western world. The gold market, crude oil, precious gems, selected strategic minerals and natural gas markets have all become a trading area that the Soviet Union has vigorously manipulated. In each and every one they have assisted in flooding that specific area with their commodity. In each area, the relative value and selling price has dropped significantly.

The price of Russian oil has ranged from a high of \$39 a barrel in January of 1981 to a low of \$33 in mid-1981. This price is presently \$1 less than Saudi Arabian light crude oil. The price cutting has forced Nigeria and the North Sea distributors to also cut their prices. By continuing to cut their prices, the Soviets are driving their competition to economic disparity and lengthening their own line of customers. This particular practice is an example of free enterprise at its best; however, it is another form of West European dependency. The situation with the other commodities is similar, flood the market, drive the price down and devalue the competitors commodity.

The question of a "shrewd" or "disorganized" Soviet businessman is difficult to answer. Time can only project an appropriate perspective. However, in the interim, the debts between East and West continue to grow with no resolution in the immediate future.

L. B. Kamenev, Deputy Chairman of the Central Soviet government, made the following statement in March 1921, "We are convinced that the foreign capitalists, who will be obliged to work on the terms we offer them, will dig their own grave . . . Foreign capital will fulfill the role Marx predicted for it . . . With every additional shovel of coal, with every additional load of oil that we in Russia obtain through the help of foreign technique, capitalists will be digging their own grave."²⁷

The economics in the USSR may be judged a dismal failure, but as long as they have customers to purchase their commodities, banks to extend credits and neighbors who disregard the warnings of their allies, one has to wonder who is losing and who is winning this confrontation.

Economics Conclusion

Even in recession, with millions unemployed and multitudes of nagging domestic problems, the U.S. economy remains unrivaled in the world in its output of goods and services.

The U.S. with only 5.1% of the world population accounts for 21.3% of the world output. It's agricultural population of 3% and a total of 5% of the work force grows 68% of the world's total food export. Its GNP is twice that of its adversary, the Soviet Union. With only a fractional amount of the world population, the U.S. produced 2.6 trillion in goods as opposed to 9.6 trillion for the remainder of the entire world.

Economics, the free enterprise system and democracy are the strong-

est attributes that the U.S. has, for all three elements form a triad and are a mutual driving force for one another. There are many political leaders who would advocate that the U.S. should become involved in an economic war against the Kremlin. Defense Secretary Weinberger is among these leaders. Although the authors of this project do not agree with his support to default on Polish debt payments,²⁸ we do concur with the present economic strategy outlined by present U.S. policy:

1. Trade. Continue to control the sale of advanced technology. The old adage of "Loose Lips Sink Ships" should become once again a public "by word."

2. Credits. Trade to the Warsaw Pact should be severely constrained and in all situations, credit accommodations should be tied to political constraints. The NATO Alliance has the financial capability to dominate the flow of currency in the USSR. A western international monetary alliance could easily complement the political needs of NATO.

3. Petroleum. All efforts should be made to restrict credits for the development of the Soviet pipeline. The U.S. should provide financial assistance, if necessary, to encourage the petroleum development of the North Sea.

4. Grain. Sale of grain must be linked to political needs. Grain is a source of extreme pressure and would have a profound impact on the Soviet Union if the U.S. were to exercise a boycott. Food is the only resource in the world that the USSR can't get enough of and with the U.S., Canada, and Australia controlling 82% of the exportable commodity, the USSR must deal with the western alliance.

The view of the author, is that the U.S. is winning the economic war with Russia. However, as it was pointed out earlier, the U.S. was

also winning the economic war with Japan in 1941. That tight economic rein on an international advisory resulted in a costly protracted, military confrontation.

In conclusion, Carl von Clausewitz helps to put this confrontation into perspective when he states,

War consists of separate successes each unrelated to the next, as in a match consisting of several games. The earlier games have no effect upon the later. All that counts is the total score, and each separate result makes its contribution toward this total.²⁹

Economics, no matter how powerful, can only make a contribution towards the score. Points scored and tallied must be counted in the political and military arena.

CHAPTER II

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CHAPTER III

THE POLITICS OF CONFRONTATION

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION

The political elements of confrontation have nearly endless ramifications that could encompass an entire study by themselves. In light of this, we shall establish some parameters for this Chapter and focus on key issues within the parameters.

An appropriate beginning is to establish what political reasons the U.S. has for defending Western Europe. The reasons will be limited to two major areas centered around national security and economics.

Next, we will discuss the nature of "the threat" to the U.S. and Western Europe along with the differing perspectives of the threat between those two political centers. The Soviet threat will be discussed in terms of direct and indirect actions that affect the role of the U.S. in preserving freedom for itself and Western Europe. Two elements of the threat will include the major issues of nuclear weapons placement in Western Europe, and defense burden sharing which are endangering NATO resolve today. Another integral part of the threat is the effect of third world destabilization and the associated dangers posed by Soviet surrogate and subversive activity.

Given the political aspects of the threat, several countermeasures will be discussed. The countermeasures will be possible methods to reduce the impact of the Soviet threat to U.S. interests in Western

Europe and contribute to the maintenance of a credible deterrence of the Warsaw Pact military forces. Also, some recommended roles for the U.S. to assume in addressing the challenges of NATO and Western Europe will be presented.

A last topic will assess the status of the U.S./NATO/Warsaw Pact relationships which will be used to give a research guided opinion of the likely category of a conflict and the reasons for choosing that selected category.

SECTION II. U.S. INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE

The first and foremost reason to defend Western Europe is for U.S. National Security. Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, was quoted by Group Captain D. Bolton of the Royal United Services Institute as stating that, "NATO was founded to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down."¹ A noted NATO commander, in an address to a USAWC Seminar stated, "perceptions of NATO have changed in that during the formative years Europe wanted the alliance more than the United States, while today the United States wants the alliance more than the Europeans do." Both quotations, although over 30 years apart, still focus on the importance of American involvement in NATO. Another interesting point that adds dimension to the decision of a nation to participate in an alliance comes from a Hans Morgenthau quote stating that, "A nation will shun an alliance if it believes that it is strong enough to hold its own unaided or that the burden of commitment resulting from an alliance is likely to outweigh the advantage expected."² This quotation is nearly prophetic when compared to the previously mentioned NATO commander's remarks. With the loss of American nuclear superiority the need for the alliance is greater for the U.S. while the benefits to the European nations is diminished and, thus, reducing their ardor for the alliance.

Deterrence of the Soviet Union is of vital importance to U.S. National Security. Western Europe and its other NATO allies are key to

the deterrence effort. This is especially true in an age where serious threat to national interest can emanate from third world intervention. A disruption of this kind affecting Arabian Gulf oil and African strategic minerals would require U.S. involvement and further accentuate the importance of a strong Western Europe defense to assist the deterrence effort.

There is no doubt that the Soviet acquisition of a highly industrialized Western Europe would place the USSR in a commanding position to become dominant in world influence. This reason alone is justification for U.S. involvement in the defense of Western Europe which not only serves our national interest, but also reduces danger for the other democracies of the world.

Economic Involvement

The economic ties between Western Europe and the U.S. have a deep intertwining history. In terms of a pre NATO time frame, "as early as August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill set out in the Atlantic Charter, goals for global cooperation for post war security, economic progress and access to trade and raw materials on equal terms for all nations."³ Shortly after WW II, American leadership implemented the Marshall Plan to assist Europe in repairing war damages. It is noteworthy that the USSR was also offered this economic assistance and not only refused it, but referred to the plan as "an instrumental of American imperialism,"⁴ thus setting the stage for a long and continuing struggle between two superpowers of opposing ideologies. The economic assistance was proven effective in Western Europe as indicated by the increases in GNP of West Germany and the United Kingdom. In 1968, West Germany had a \$78 billion GNP; \$186 billion in 1978 and \$411 billion by 1975. Accordingly, the

United Kingdom increased from \$71 billion in 1968 to \$121 billion in 1978 and \$224 billion by 1975.⁵ By 1975, the European community became a major trading partner of the United States accounting for 21% of our foreign trade.⁶

The importance of economics has increased its role in national security. Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, when addressing such elements as oil crisis, monetary instability, worldwide inflation and unemployment, pointed out, "the necessity is to safeguard free trade access to energy supplies and to raw materials, and the need for a monetary system which will help us to reach those targets."⁷ Economic strength is a key element in the ability of a nation to sustain a non-nuclear conventional war or "to wage a cold war more effectively."⁸

Much more could be cited with regard to the importance of US/Western Europe economic ties, but the point can be summed up by Morton Kaplan who states "The major aim in which Soviet-American accommodation is required is Europe, for in the current stage of history, this is the area of the world with the greatest concentration of skilled manpower and economic productivity outside of the Soviet Union and the United States."⁹

There are two other factors that are woven into the fabric of U.S./Western Europe relations even though their impact on a day to day basis is overshadowed by the more visible factors of national security and economics. The two are ethnic heritage and religious ties. The roots of heritage for the American population is largely of European derivation. Many Americans can remember the suffering of the European countries during two world wars and more recently the objectionable

methods of government control exercised on the Eastern Bloc countries. The Soviet Union has further reinforced that concern in Poland. Heritage, combined with a deep sense for human rights, creates a strong affinity for the European culture by the American populace. The cultures between America and Western Europe have similar ideologies and share an aversion to the oppressive nature of the Soviet communistic environment. Recent polls show an indepth reciprocal commitment by both the U.S. and the West European countries. The ethnic and religious affiliations continue to be extremely important factors for the continued bonding of these two international powers. In recalling the campaigns of religious wars one can sense the strong influence that religious beliefs had to precipitate conflict. Even the heritage of the United States began with the desire for freedom of worship. The similarities of the Protestant/Catholic influence will always be an element of identification and a part of the political destinies for both the United States and Western Europe.

SECTION III. THE POLITICAL THREAT

In this section we will discuss those elements that threaten the preservation of peace and U.S. relations with Western Europe. As a beginning, the term threat needs definition in order to facilitate the identification of threat elements. Webster's definition is "an expression of intentions to inflict evil, injury, or damage." Evil, injury or damage is certainly the result of such events as a loss of sovereignty, a loss of territory, or a loss of national wealth, all of which can be imposed by use of direct or indirect military power.

Politically, the Soviet Union has been a long-term adversary as previously established in Section II. Winston Churchill expressed his perception of the Soviet threat when he delivered his famous sentence "an iron curtain is drawn down upon their front (Russia). We do not know what is going on behind."¹⁰ This occurred as a result of the Yalta Agreements in 1945 which resulted in the "division of Europe into spheres of influence, and any attempt to alter the balance of power in Eastern Europe would mean war."¹¹ There has been much discussion about the reprehensible manner in which the USSR has responded to the provisions of the Yalta Agreement by not holding free elections in the captive countries. The opposing ideologies of democracy versus communism was evident before the end of WWII, but the true colors of the Soviets were displayed when their failure to demobilize their army emerged while the United States and its allies vastly reduced their military

strengths. The resulting political pressure applied by the USSR on Greece, Turkey, Northern Iran, and Asia created the necessary environment to form the NATO Alliance. Thus began the long-term struggle of the global chess game.

The Soviet Threat

First and foremost, the threat from the Soviet Union is from its vast military power. There are several forms the threat can assume, but none would be credible without an ominous military base. There are two basic schools of thought regarding Soviet motives for their military buildup. There is a feeling among some who have professional insight into the Soviet infrastructure that the military buildup could be defensive for several reasons such as;

1. Continuing social awareness maintained over the loss of 20 million lives during WWII and their subsequent desire to avoid any similar occurrence.
2. A declining economy in Poland and Czechoslovakia with possible policing actions necessary at any time. ("The USSR threatened or used military force or military ties on Eastern Europe for intrabloc policing functions nine times between 1945 and 1980.")
3. Existing Soviet paranoia based on a general sense of animosity from outside Soviet borders.¹²
4. China causing 25% of the Soviet land forces to be deployed for protection along the Sino-Soviet border.

In contrast, there is also strong opinion that the Soviet buildup is offensive in nature. Henry Kissinger stated that, "Never in history has it happened that a nation achieved superiority in all significant weapons categories without seeking to translate it at some point into

some foreign policy benefit.¹³ This is the point of view which demonstrates the nature of the Soviet threat to the United States and Western Europe. The use of a strong military capability can achieve political goals by either use of force or by threat and blackmail. Brigadier General Zeb Bradford provided an appropriate analogy of Soviet methodology to accomplish its political goals by comparing the USSR to a hotel thief, "the thief will go up and down the hallways trying doors and entering those he finds unlocked."¹⁴

One of the major sources of Soviet influence that most threatens "unlocked doors" is the intended use of the vastly expanded Soviet navy. Its use in peacetime is understandably for political advantage, but if maritime power shifted severely toward the Soviet Union, it would be possible that they could "isolate Europe by sea and prevent the passage of essential supplies and reinforcements to and from the United States; the effect upon Allied confidence and political cohesion would be profound."¹⁵

Soviet expansionism to world dominance is the ultimate goal for the USSR. This is to be accomplished by the use of implied military strength and subversive acquisition and control of key world resources. Their Third World, client/surrogate activities in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were a part of their positioning for warm water naval bases and access to strategic minerals. The control of Arabian Gulf oil and strategic minerals could bring Western Europe to its knees as surely as an armored attack from the Eastern Bloc. Political objectives considered key to the Soviet expansionism goal are "to consolidate and maintain their hold on Eastern Europe and to bring Western Europe under Soviet hegemony."¹⁶ The USSR

is well aware of war theory and would prefer to gain its objectives without resorting to armed hostilities, e.g. a long non-hostile war. To achieve the desired objectives, the Soviets do have a definite military strategy should it be needed. LTC Henry Gole, of the US Army Strategic Studies Institute, states that "NATO assumes Soviet policy will continue to be based on economic means, political means, propaganda, subversion, and military power in that order."¹⁷

The Non-Soviet Threat to Western Europe

There are some Western European/US vulnerabilities that are not inflicted by the Soviets, but rather by differences between the United States and Western Europe. Although there have been minor squabbles in the NATO Alliance for years, the number one problem in Western Europe stems from the loss of nuclear superiority of the United States. This problem is the resistance to placement of the Ground Launched Cruise missiles and the Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. The problem proliferated with the introduction of the neutron bomb as a response to FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's request for an answer to Soviet SS-20 deployment. In 1979, an agreement was made to deploy the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and Pershing II Missile (P-II), but peace movements in Western Europe have severely hampered progress. Some contend that the peace movements are not Soviet inspired and others claim they are. An article from a London newspaper referred to "Moscow's energetic support for disarmament demonstrations in Western Europe."¹⁸ An Army War College lecturer recently stated he was of the opinion that the peace movement had a sort of cadre that showed up at major demonstrations throughout Western Germany. The peace movement has been dulled by three principle elements: (1) The ripple effect of the

Whiskey Class Russian submarine incident in Sweden in November of 1981; (2) the initiation of arms reduction talks by President Reagan; and (3) an exceptionally cold winter in 1982.

An inconsistency prevails throughout Europe in that the placement of the missiles is viewed as an unnecessary event by some Swedish Ministry of Defense Personnel;¹⁹ however, on the other hand, they view deterrence as the greatest balancing force in NATO.

The second most critical problem in Western Europe is defense burden sharing. The United States has been the major contributor to NATO defense. The US has lobbied to distribute the cost of NATO defense more evenly. In 1979, NATO members agreed to a 3% real increase, beyond inflation and over a five-year period to commence in 1979. However, a problem of actual defense growth arises from the rising costs of weapons and a preference for civil spending. In addition, "members of NATO have been under domestic pressure to reduce defense spending."²⁰ Hence there is a question as to how much has been accomplished by the increased defense spending. As is the case for most controversial subject, there is a case for both sides. The US has heavy expenditures for its nuclear control and is paying a premium for manpower through the All Volunteer Force (AVF) concept. Those Western Europeans using a conscript system get more manpower for less cost. Also the equipment contribution from Western Europe is noteworthy as outlined in NATO review.²¹

1. European allies make available about 91% of the allied ground forces and 75% of the air forces in Europe.

2. Seventy-five percent of the tanks of allied nations and more than 90% of their armored and mechanized divisions come from European countries.

3. The European nations of NATO maintain three million soldiers in

time of peace and can double with mobilization.

While the equipment contribution is notable, former Chief of Staff, General Harold V. Johnson, is of the opinion that allied equipment purchases are insufficient, with emphasis on the vulnerability of not "maintaining ammunition and other stocks that would be needed to sustain a war."²²

A last politically sensitive subject centers around the ever present concept of US troop removal from Western Europe. Again there are proponents for both sides of the question. "For removal," states, strong arguments of freeing American troops for other global contingencies; it would also be a strong stimulus for Western Europe to do more for their security; and no longer keep American troops "as hostages to insure the American nuclear deterrent."²³ Those against removal have the better argument in the author's opinion; reductions of strength can be interpreted by Moscow as a sign of weakness²⁴ and invite invasion of this essential area. To meet Persian Gulf contingencies; US troops stationed in Europe are already 2/3 of the way there and loss of US presence could force Europe into a Finlandization merely through Soviet intimidation rather than elect to make up the shortfall in military capability.

SECTION IV. US ROLE IN COUNTERMEASURE

Before one can counter a threat, the threat must be carefully studied from as many points of view as possible. The question must be asked: Are the Russians really 10 feet tall? Perhaps not considering the internal vulnerabilities they suffer ranging from economic problems in Poland, agriculture shortfalls, the potential threat of China, and general disfavor around the world. Americans have been accused of having "excessive ideological convictions toward the USSR."²⁵ A typical American response is to consider a Russian concept as automatically a detriment to the US due to ideological polarity.

The Different Perspective

The United States considers the USSR to be responsible for much of the world unrest today. This perception is not invalid, but the intensity of the threat perception is different than that of Western Europe. Some examples in the different perceptions are the reaction of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, where Americans considered the invasion as a turning point of Russian foreign policy, e.g., an act of aggression making the first attempt for new territory since the 1945 Yalta Agreement.²⁶ On the other hand, some Western European governments viewed the invasion as a predictable act of Soviet behavior. Of more importance to Europeans was the maintenance of Ostpolitik in West Germany, a "glad its not me" attitude in the Northern Flank and a general desire not to

destabilize detente over the incident. This incident highlighted the differences between Western Europe and the US in their view of detente. "Europe has, broadly speaking, derived benefit from detente and wished to pursue it . . . a growing opposition to it (had developed) in the US, where it had not led to the same tangible results as in Europe."²⁷ A major factor in the differences in perspective is directly related to geography. Due to the proximity of Western Europe to the USSR, there is more dependence on trade, a lesser concern over global incidences and a strong desire to maintain peace.

With these foregoing remarks, it is obvious that the US needs to counter two major threats to our Western European interests. One being over the Soviet threat and the other is the ailing cohesion of NATO defense attitudes.

To counter the Soviets, Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, suggests that "the Soviet Union has certain interests and certain vulnerabilities . . . (which the US can deal with them through) . . . political, economic, and security assets."²⁸ Perhaps some of the methods Secretary Haig had in mind would include:

1. The renouncement or enforcement of the 1945 Yalta Agreements to show Eastern Bloc countries a supportive trend that we have not written off their aspirations for a better life. This approach was not favored by a noted NATO leader who, during a lecture at USAWC, expressed the thought that tampering with old agreements might cause the USSR to use agreement changes that would result in even a greater Soviet advantage.

2. The continuation of dialog between the US and USSR is an essential element in avoiding confrontation. This is consistent with Secretary Haig's statement that "we can no more solve our problems by

avoiding the negotiating table than by resting our hopes on it alone."²⁹

3. The possible leverage of economic foreclosure on Eastern Bloc debts is a method to raise the cost of credit to the USSR at a time when the Warsaw Pact countries are in a general economic decline complicated by a declining growth rate; and agricultural shortfalls persist to drain Russian gold reserves. In the absence of foreclosure, an austere, tightly controlled credit program might also be considered.

4. Economic sanctions used on Poland and the USSR were effective and, although viewed by Western Europe with some apprehension, they can be a gentle non-hostile persuader.

5. A last technique that will be suggested here, but not necessarily the last of the possibilities, is the propaganda approach to the failing of communism. Politically it can be detrimental to Eastern Bloc stability, increase Russian worker discontent, and further complicate future ally acquisition for the USSR. This rather subtle and discreet approach must be approached very carefully. A total collapse could cause a reverse desired effect and initiate hostilities rather than deter. This is made very clear by Brigadier General Zeb Bradford of the Policy and Plans Division of SHAPE HQS by his statement, "If communism is appearing to fail, war is likely to result."³⁰

In addressing the cohesion of Western Europe and the United States, we must carefully weigh each controversial issue for its cost effectiveness to demand US compliance. One European opinion from London was that when Americans make a proposal and Western Europe sees that proposal from a different point of view, the United States appears quick to accuse them of furthering the cohesion problem through statements of

noncompliance and lack of unity. It is important that the United States not back down from stances of great importance such as the placement of Pershing IIs and GLCMs in spite of the current public dissention. A key defense decision of that importance cannot afford to fail. LTC Harry Wilson, a U.S. Army political and economic advisor at SHAPE HQS, mentioned that the "United States can furnish and assist with data to support nuclear placement, but it will take Europeans to convince Europeans."³¹ This suggests a firm but low profile might serve US and Western Europe interest best.

Many speakers at the US Army War College have spoken of the need for increased sensitivity to the European point of view. We have often heard the old adage, its not what you say, but how you say it that matters. If this is true, there is credance to the suggestion of altering the term Theater Nuclear Force (TNF) to Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF). Intermediate suggests to Europeans that their homeland is not the intended impact zone. Another suggestion came from the Royal United Services Institute suggesting that the goal of NATO be changed from deterrence to something of a less nuclear oriented term such as "security and containment or containment and detente."³²

Other appropriate US roles include assurance of two way communication. A Swedish interviewee mentioned that he wasn't sure that Europeans were adequately communicating their needs to the US, thus contributing to a lack of communication.³³ Another source of Western Europe anxiety is the frequent changes of the top leadership in the U.S. This creates uncertainty in the eyes of our allies regarding the effects of possible policy changes. Our allies would prefer an element of consistency in our foreign policy, which is better today than it has been in the recent past. A policy of "no surprises, but rather the creation of

a consultative environment is essential to cohesion. In the face of what is likely to be a difficult troubled world in the 1980s, the process of political consultation is once again assuming greater importance and urgency.³⁴

The bottom line of this section is that the US must take all possible active and passive actions to strengthen Western Europe in order to create a credible defense which will either prevent armed hostilities or prepare the NATO allies to win in war.

SECTION V. CONCLUSIONS

The big question is will there be a US/USSR war and if so when? Obviously these questions aren't answerable due to the complexity of the factors involved. There is one conclusion which can be made, that we are presently in a non-shooting war with the USSR, and have been since the early 1940s. Each side has had its triumphs and its defeats, mostly of a political nature. Examples of victory are the results of the Cuban Crisis when the US used the political power of its nuclear superiority. The Russians political victory resulted from their detente activities, where they emerged from detente with military superiority, expanded world influence, and made an improvement in their technology base. One of Webster's definitions of war is "a struggle between opposing forces for a particular end." This definition clearly shows that war can be of a non-hostile nature, as our strategic struggle continues against the Russian factors of influence.

It is quite possible that a shooting war will occur in the future. The most likely political cause would be the failure of communism, forcing the USSR to resort to "policy with other means"³⁵ but for the time being, as long as the USSR can exert its influence without armed conflict, we believe it will continue to do so.

During interviews at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, the Royal United Services Institute of London, England and the Office of the Ministry of Defense in Stockholm, Sweden, it became evident that most believed an

armed conflict would, of necessity, be of short duration for several reasons:

1. The shock techniques of the USSR battle plan requires a rapid breakthrough of defensive lines with minimum warning to be successful. This would suggest creating the inability to reinforce on the West and likely result in a short confrontation.

2. In the event of nuclear release, the narrow depth of Western Europe would cause great damage, thus enhancing the likelihood of a short war.

3. The allies have a serious shortfall of available ammunition and other war materials. This makes it doubtful that anything other than a short war could be sustained.

4. A last point comes from Robert Leckie's book, The Wars of America where he quotes Ho Chi Minh as saying, "the United States will tire of a lengthy war" and "the United States does not have the stomach for a protracted war."³⁶ Without a strong stimulus for increased nationalism, this may well reflect the will of Americans.

The length of a conflict will be determined by a myriad of factors and is scenario dependent. The possibilities are limitless and largely academic. The political gains of an armed conflict do not appear to match the risk of war for the USSR at the present. In light of these statements, a proper conclusion is that the United States must pursue the strengthening of NATO as presented, in order to allow NATO to progress and continue to be a deterrent as it has so successfully done for the past 33 years.

CHAPTER III

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CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION

The Soviet Military Threat

Various scenarios depicting confrontation between the Warsaw Pact forces and the NATO Alliance have been created utilizing a wide variety of "probable" sequences. Epic battles featuring the gentle rolling terrain of Germany interrupted by the geographic funnels of Meiningen, Hof, and Fulda, have followed the careers of every officer in the United States Army. For decades, map exercises, terrain studies and simulated combat maneuvers have been used to train the US Army, with most of these situations featuring the map sheets of Western Europe. But now, more than ever before, the nagging question surfaces. "Will these practice exercises turn to reality?"

The Soviet threat is a daily experience, its presence is felt throughout the world with each point of interference drawing it closer to its goal, the capitulation of Western Europe. A threat to Western Europe is a profound threat to US national security objectives.

Soviet strategic nuclear forces pose the greatest threat to the US and Europe. Soviet missile forces have moved from a position of inferiority in the 1960s to one in which they are generally recognized as equal or superior to NATO at the present date.

Since the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union has dramatically upgraded its

strategic intercontinental ballistic missile force with the introduction of the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 missiles, equipped with multiple, independently targetable, reentry vehicles (MIRV).

Soviet missiles at every level are being replaced by missiles with improved reliability, range, payload accuracy, and survivability. The rapid emergence of the SS-20 as a coercive threat to the citizens of Western Europe is a pronounced threat to NATO stability.

Leonid Brezhnev's recent announcement that the USSR would stop the deployment of additional SS-20 intermediate range missiles in Europe if the US would not deploy its new missiles is a typical example of the type of coercive dialogue presented by the USSR.

An additional inference provided by Sverre Lodgaard, a research fellow for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is that the SS-20 with only one warhead has the capability of striking the US continent. Hence, the first of two SS-20 rockets would be targeted on Europe while the second organic weapon could be targeted on the United States 3000+ miles away.¹

Of specific concern are the Typhoon, Oscar, November, Echo, Victor and Alpha class submarines which give the Soviets the capability of striking anywhere on earth with their SLBM payloads.

The capability to strike anywhere on earth was eminently underscored when a Whiskey class submarine was recently found beached in a "supposed secure" area in Swedish waters.

The Soviet Air Force relying on Badger, Blinder, and Backfire aircraft can carry out nuclear missions covering all of NATO. Utilization of a polar route makes these aircraft an equally dangerous threat to the North American continent. Air strips found in Cuba and Grenada could provide adequate landing zones for such a venture.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which began 30 November 1981, will play a major role in opening or closing the window of vulnerability between US and USSR strategic forces. Failure of these talks plus the ever-widening lack of a modern day US nuclear deterrence will place NATO in an even more vulnerable position from the Soviet threat.

Numbers of themselves are not always significant, but an examination of Russian armaments is formidable:

50,000 Soviet tanks, 9,000 winged aircraft and 5,200 helicopters; 22,000 artillery pieces; 1,700 warships; 7,000 nuclear warheads on intercontinental missiles; 3.7 million troops, not including RGB forces and construction troops.²

But there has to be a point in confrontation where quantity exceeds quality. Numbers of this scope have to create a tremendous sense of uneasiness, an uneasiness which projects itself throughout every area of interest for the United States. For as history is evaluated, when nations are heavily armed and they exhibit expansionist tendencies, these nations become more, not less, dangerous during periods of domestic, economic, and political adversity. The possibility of war is a trend which is a direct result of the Soviet threat.

The reality of the military confrontation waits only for the time and the hour to be designated by the Warsaw Pact Nations. For those who would dismiss this possibility, closely examine the following passages to determine the epoch to which they belong:

1. They are aggressive because they are surrounded by potential enemies.
2. They suffered severe casualties during the past war and want only to experience peace.
3. Aggression is not their primary intent.
4. They are only following the course of every new, progres-

sive nation.

5. Their economic and social situations at home are creating problems.

6. They are not ten feet tall and do not need to be feared.

7. They need arms solely for defense.³

It doesn't take much reflection to speculate on the tendencies of an empire which is losing every race except the one the US dares not accept defeat in, the arms race. Keep in mind that Hitler's Third Reich was a maze of domestic practices and policies; however, as confused and jumbled as they were, Nazi Germany was able to organize a formidable military force which humbled the might of all Europe. All of the previous seven passages were used to describe Germany in the late 1930s. History has been known to repeat itself.

The military threat in Europe is real, the threat is pronounced, the threat is now! The obvious question can only be "when?" von Clausewitz helps to put this confrontation in perspective when he states:

If two parties have prepared for war, some motive of hostility must have brought them to that point. Moreover, so long as they remain under arms, do not negotiate a settlement, that motive of hostility must still be active. Only one consideration can restrain it — a desire to wait for a better moment before acting.⁴

A protracted war/short war confrontation becomes profoundly realistic when one realizes that:

Starting around the middle of 1982, Russia will have enough of its accurate new missiles to be able to destroy virtually all the American land based nuclear missiles in a single horrendous attack, and to do it by using only a fraction of its own striking force.⁵

One has to wonder if President Brezhnev's recent offer to stop the deployment of SS-20 intermediate range weapons has to be because they

have reached the level of saturation that they desire?

Given that an acknowledged US window of vulnerability will close shut with the deployment of the MX, silo busting missiles on land, the accurate Trident 2 missiles at sea, plus the development of the stealth bomber, and the completion of the 600 vessel Navy by 1990, one must presume that if the USSR is going to act, that period of time between 1982 and 1989 could be most eventful. "The better moment" is a Russian advantage; the threat to the security of the US and NATO is real and pronounced.

The Nuclear and Chemical Threat

If one is to agree to the obvious that the Warsaw Pact is stronger in every significant military area, then conversely, the same premise is true about the economic strength of the NATO Alliance. Through these comparisons, many would like to promote the belief that a parity exists. However, nothing could be further from the truth. If the NATO Alliance attempts to exercise its economic strength, it can cause great leverage on the Warsaw Pact nations. But if the Warsaw Pact elects to exercise its strength, it can completely erase the power of its western adversary.

Since 1945, Russia's military motives were presumed to be defensive, but since 1979, that viewpoint has changed quickly with the USSR's aggressive strike into Afghanistan. The ambitious expenditure of 11-14% of its GNP has produced the greatest military force this world has ever experienced.

History has frequently shown that when a defensive belligerent turns to an offensive marander, it must be addressed. The situation in

Afghanistan has dramatically shown that Russia is prepared to wield its military might outside its post-Yalta boundaries.

More frightening than its conventional force of "173 divisions and 1.8 million military personnel, plus a reserve of 5,848,888 is its present nuclear superiority."⁷

Deterrence is overwhelming! Not only does the USSR have the ability to deter the US, but the other independent powers of Britain, France, and China as well. Its present tally of nuclear weapons dramatically exceeds the capabilities of its adversaries. The accuracy of the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 missiles create a possible scenario of destroying any adversaries' missiles in their present hardened silos.

Numbers can be misleading and ambiguous; however, they do provide a stark reality. The Soviet lead is obvious in many measures. Their strategic nuclear weapons have a total explosive power of 7,868 megatons vs 3,585 megatons for the US (one megaton equals one million tons of TNT); the Soviets have 2,537 delivery vehicles to America's 1,944. The only area in which a US superiority exists is the number of nuclear warheads, 9,480 to 8,840.⁸ However, this lead is rapidly depreciating. To further confuse this perspective, the USSR has a lead in land-based missiles, their 1,398 ICBMs have the capability of carrying 5,540 warheads compared to only 1,052 US ICBMs with 2,152 warheads. However, the US has nearly twice as many bombers capable of dropping nearly ten times as many nuclear bombs. This issue becomes even more difficult to grasp when one appreciates that while the Soviet submarine fleet outnumbers US nuclear subs, the US fleet carries more than twice as many nuclear warheads.⁹ Intellect, strategy, timing, and surprise hold the key to the decisive use of these catastrophic weapons by either force.

Additionally, their acknowledged experimentation and utilization of

biological and chemical toxins put its use in a direct parallel with events from the Second World War.

Not until June 1944 was it learned that European Jewry was being exterminated and that the principal "killing center" was the Auschwitz group of concentration camps in Poland. There, from May 1942 to January 1945, the Nazis killed two million Jews and another two million non-Jews, mostly in gas chambers.¹⁰

Frequent public exclamations from a variety of forums and sources have protested the "yellow rain," but as in Auschwitz none will believe these exclamations:

US administration officials handling the issue complain that despite all this, they cannot generate any wide spread popular outcry about Soviet weapons that leave primitive tribesmen choking to death in their own blood. Thousands of people march in the capitals of Europe protesting plans to deploy missiles in Europe, but there is no peep of protest at flagrant Soviet violations of existing arms control treaties.¹¹

It is difficult to project whether the USSR will utilize this weapon, but the fact that the weapon exists and is being used in both Laos and Afghanistan diminishes the probability to a minimum.

One has only to look to the past to gain a perspective of what might take place in the future. "First used by the Germans at Ypres Belgium, in 1914, poison gas resulted in casualties estimated as high as 1.3 million during World War I."¹²

With the nuclear deterrence becoming a stalemate in terms of use by either side, the question of conventional warfare becomes a greater possibility. Granted that the US and NATO have accomplished a great deal in the past five years preparing for chemical warfare, it is still an extremely vulnerable area. In addition, there are no known antidotes for the "yellow rain" and "silent killer" chemicals that Russia is experimenting with in Afghanistan and Laos.

In terms of strategic implications, the use of biochemical and

binary weapons will, at the very least, raise the possibility of an enormously expensive and awesomely dangerous arms race which can only add to the domestic complications of the NATO Alliance.

The very fact that in 1972 the USSR signed the Biological Weapons Convention, which was negotiated, signed and ratified when the illusions of detente were popular can only indicate the level of their sincerity. Our military experts are convinced that: "Russia views chemical warfare as a logical step up from conventional combat — a tactic that might be expected to achieve battlefield goals without triggering nuclear retaliation."¹³

The possibility of both of these catastrophic weapons being used in the future is more than just a remote probability. Documentation from the USSR best summarizes the entire subject — the Soviet Union's Strategic Missile Force (i.e., Strategic Rocket Troops), according to all three editions of Sokolovsky's Military Strategy state:

The missile forces possess the highest degree of combat readiness and are able, in the shortest time, to destroy and demolish enormous numbers of objectives over wide areas and at any depth, and are capable of causing the enemy irretrievable losses, and in some cases forcing him to surrender.¹⁴

Conventional forces, nuclear forces, proximity, mobilization capabilities and much, much more add to the threat capabilities of the USSR.

Enhanced radiation, kinetic thrust weapons, sophisticated tactics and a wide variety of technology advances all serve as force multipliers for the US. But at some point there again has to be a question where quantity exceeds quality. "... Examples may show that in modern Europe, even the most talented general will find it very difficult to defeat an opponent twice its size."¹⁵

Utilization of lethal chemical or nuclear weapons can only lead to a devastating war. The US will not give up and the USSR will have too

many weapons left to preclude their defeat.

Logistics

In June of 1812, one of the largest invasions that Europe has ever witnessed took place when Napoleon began his siege on Russia. By September 14, French forces had reached Moscow and participated in its destruction by fire. However, by 19 October, Napoleon realized the futility of his actions and the remnants of his force of 600,000 men, began their retreat from the capital of Russia.

In mid-June of 1941, Hitler ordered a similar invasion of Russia. Nazi German forces, numbering 3,200,000 reached Leningrad by November, with smaller contingents actually reaching Moscow. For two years, German and Russian forces were to contest the control of this area. Finally in December of 1945 the Germans, like the French before them, were forced to withdraw.

In both instances, it was not Russian military genius, the will of the people, nor the harsh winter weather which caused defeat. It was the impossibility of keeping a huge army supplied, in hostile territory, with a narrow, enormously long line of communication exposed to constant attack.

The lack of logistics had played an immensely important role in the defeat of these two superior forces. And like the previous conflicts, the circumstances surrounding the distance between Moscow and the European coast is still the same. It's a strategic distance that is too long for an attacking force to sustain for any extended period of time.

What makes it particularly difficult is that the modern armies of today rely on petroleum to provide the energy for this mechanized power. Without gasoline, DF2, JP4 and other similar fuels, an army cannot carry

on a successful, penetrating offense in Europe. Russia knows full well that the weakness which brought about the demise of Napoleon and Hitler's offense, could also depreciate a Warsaw Pact siege.

The USSR also knows, that to eliminate the problem of a critical petroleum need, they must prestock storage sites as far forward as possible. In addition, they must dramatically increase their petroleum production to meet the needs of a "surge" which would take place in a military confrontation. A Soviet tank or motorized rifle division in reserve will expend from 190 to 220 metric tons of POL per day. In the attack, the consumption rates of these same divisions will raise from 500 to 600 metric tons per day. A Warsaw Pact front could consume as much as 42 thousand metric tons of POL per day in combat.¹⁶ It is easy to see that the capability to provide a petroleum "surge" is an absolute must for Russian strategy to succeed. Additionally, in peacetime, petroleum assets would also provide a much needed supply of hard currency when domestic and military needs have been met.

To offset the extremely expensive investment of acquiring the petroleum, the USSR has offered Western Europe (the) unneeded natural gas, (which is a by-product of each oil well.) They keep the crude for their own purposes and finance the entire proposition through the sale of natural gas. Not only do they raise the Western Europe dependency for natural gas from 17% to 35%, but they establish a very profitable trading relationship for the USSR.

In addition, with extensive planning and modifications within the natural gas pumping stations, crude oil could pass through the same pipeline that West Europe expects to receive natural gas from its Soviet supplier.

Western Europe may be helping to finance its own demise. At the very least, profits realized by the USSR can only help to widen its nuclear and conventional military lead.

Regardless of whether the pipeline is ever built, the USSR must establish logistical lines of communication through Poland and Czechoslovakia. Both of these countries have experienced severe civilian repression from Russian intervention.

This act alone makes one wonder if the civilians and the military in those countries will support the USSR.

In December of 1981, it was widely acclaimed that the Polish military played a major role in suppressing the Polish Solidarity Union.

Most of the acts of brutality that have been committed in the five weeks since Jaruzelski imposed martial law on Poland have not been the work of the young, generally amiable army recruits, but that of independent security squads specially trained to use force on their countrymen. . . .

The most feared and hated of the security forces are the 20,000 to 25,000 troops known as ZOMO. . . .¹⁷

If this is in fact true, one must again wonder what actions must have taken place prior to the downfall of Solidarity to make General Jaruzelski and his USSR friends doubt the loyalty of the Polish military.

The following excerpt might cast some light on this subject, "The KGBs interest in the Polish military may be related to British reports that most of Poland's tanks were sabotaged during the Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Poland earlier this year."¹⁸

The Polish communication zone becomes even more unpredictable for the USSR if one examines recent reports that more than just a question of loyalty, there is also a questionable level of trust and reliability.

The United States has received intelligence reports indicating that several hundred young Polish soldiers defected last month and regrouped in the forests of Silesia to form a partisan resistance unit. If the reports are correct, this would be the first breakdown in the tight discipline of the regular army since General Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law three months ago. It would give Polish authorities more cause to fear that warm weather will inspire a resurgence of Polish resistance to military rule.¹⁹

Even though these situations might be viewed as isolated and few in number, they do constitute "vital life signs" that the Polish body is still alive. Counter these events with the emotional Mayday demonstration on May 1, 1982 of tens of thousands of Polish citizens in Warsaw chanting, "Down with the junta," one cannot help but feel that the Polish crisis is far from over. Complement this problem with the realization that of all the segments in the Polish society, the one judged most loyal to the preservation of its national integrity is the Army. One immediately senses an impending confrontation between Soviet and Polish forces.

If a war in Central Europe was to take place, quality differences such as technology, morale, and readiness would play a major role. But even more important would be the role of logistical reinforcement. With a minimum of three days warning prior to a Warsaw Pact invasion, the US and the UK could put some of their personnel in position, however, presently it wouldn't be adequate. By 1983, the US will be able to move five combat ready reinforcement divisions to Germany to join their prepositioned equipment in three weeks. This sounds laborously slow, but it is much faster than the USSR could mobilize. However, using Category I forces on hand, the USSR wouldn't need to mobilize. In addition, the Russians can mobilize a "horde" of forces for their second stage, while the US would have to mobilize reservists plus create a draft. Forces from this pool would not make an impact for 30 to 90

days.

The USSR's obvious advantage is her proximity. Even though her lines of communication would be extended and vulnerable, Russia sits inside Europe, whereas the main source of NATO's reinforcements, the United States, is 3,000 miles away.

Senator Nunn, from the state of Georgia, best summarized the dilemma of logistics when he stated,

"Decreased warning imposes even greater restraints upon the movement of adequate US forces in Europe. They would have to move exclusively by air, since forces moved by sea would not arrive in time. The problem is compounded by an already inadequate US strategic airlift capability and by an acute shortage of key arms and equipment."²⁰

Logistics is a significant problem for the US in the defense of NATO. If the problems involving equipment and material shortages, plus strategic lift are not resolved in the immediate future, the NATO alliance would never experience a protracted conflict with the Warsaw Pact. A confrontation would, by necessity, be extremely short in duration.

Besides the questions of extended lines of communication and the dependency on petroleum, another question which is a major challenge for NATO is the future of standardization. Although there is an explicit NATO process which describes the intent of this program, it has not been satisfactorily used.

At the conclusion of the second world war, the US was the sole major power with its military strength and economic productivity intact. Rather than commit assets to the creation of a military need, it was more important for Western European countries to recognize the needs of their domestic industrial economy. Hence, most military purchases were made from the United States. This void continued in Western Europe for about 25 years. Slowly, but surely, the situation

began to change.

Economies throughout Western Europe are such now that they can competitively and technologically meet the needs of any military design on the market. However, the challenge to begin standardization by the NATO Alliance has not been accepted. "Dr. Thomas A. Callaghan, a noted European authority on NATO, estimates allied waste in excess of \$18 billion a year because of lack of standardization."²¹ This profound waste in time, energy, research and money is a severe handicap that is not experienced by the Warsaw Pact which has only one major source for equipment. Although, there is strength in a multitude of expressions, there is also adversity in not being able to agree on a single selection. It is very difficult for Americans to grasp that NATO's European members possess the worlds largest industrial plant, a population greater than that of the United States or the Soviet Union and an aggregate gross national product larger than the American GNP and over double that of the USSR.

Lowering a prejudiced, parochial viewpoint that European equipment cannot enhance the strength of NATO would dramatically improve the interoperability dilemma. Unfortunately, the American Labor lobby is extremely reluctant to allow American money to be spent on non-American military products.

Additionally, identification of requirements for a particular system, selection of the best bidders, construction of a few prototypes and free enterprise, should prevail in a "supposed" democratic society. Failure to seize upon a dramatic NATO economic strength would be a USSR advantage.

Of all the previous challenges mentioned, standization is one

specific area that the United States could be the driving force. The present industrial competitions between the automotive industries of Japan and the US is a perfect example of how quickly quality would rise to the top.

Standardization is another area that would influence the length of a protracted war/short war. Inability of NATO to resolve this dilemma will depreciate their performance if a confrontation takes place.

Although, lines of communication, petroleum needs, strategic lift and interoperability pose overwhelming challenges for the NATO alliance, all can be resolved through persistent, practical measures in a period of time. But if the Warsaw Pact chooses to attack within this "problematical" time frame, a military confrontation in Europe could wind down very quickly due to any single weak link in the previously mentioned, logistical chain.

Conventional Forces

The Warsaw Pact is a military and political alliance signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955. The original members were the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The Warsaw Pact was created through the manipulation of the USSR while the NATO Alliance evolved through a mutual invitation of the West European nations on 4 April 1949. Both were created with the intent of providing deterrence against each other.

The strength of the Warsaw Pact is overwhelmingly awesome. Collectively, their power is significant, but the bulk of that immense force is specifically Russian. Examination by country reveals the following with respect to military personnel.

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Total Strength</u>	<u>Conscripts</u>	<u>Reserves</u>	<u>Para Military</u>
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Bulgaria	105,000	70,000	240,000	175,000
Czechoslovakia	194,000	117,000	325,000	158,000
German Democratic Republic	167,000	92,000	305,000	525,000
Hungary	101,000	58,000	143,000	75,000
Poland	319,000	187,000	605,000	425,000
Romania	184,500	110,000	300,000	937,000
<u>USSR</u>	<u>3,673,000</u>	<u>2,000,000</u>	<u>25,000,000</u>	<u>85,000,000</u>
Total	4,744,000	2,464,700	26,918,000	87,265,000

(51%-Total force)²²

As we examine these numbers, they are ominous when evaluated collectively, however, a closer examination shows that Warsaw Pact forces have three degrees of combat readiness: Category I, between three-quarters and full strength, with complete equipment; Category II, between half and three-quarters strength, complete with fighting vehicles; Category III, about one-quarter strength, possibly complete with fighting vehicles, some of which will be obsolete. The category which is obviously in position and ready to fight immediately is Category I. It is this force which possess the greatest threat to the NATO alliance. Category I units are found in the following areas:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Category</u>
Eastern Europe	31 divisions	1 Arty, 15 Tk, 15 mtr rifle	all Cat. I
European USSR	67 Divisions	23 Tk, 38 mtr rifle, 16 Airborne, 7 Arty,	(3) Cat. I (14) Cat. II (50) Cat. III
Central USSR	6 Divisions	1 Tk, 5 mtr rifle	(6) Cat. III
Southern USSR	24 Divisions	1 Tk, 21 mtr rifle 2 airborne	(5) Cat. I (5) Cat. II

			(14) Cat. III
Sino-Soviet Border	46 Divisions	6 Tk, 37 mtr rifle 3 Arty.	(7) Cat. I (17) Cat. II (22) Cat. III
Afghanistan	6 Divisions	5 mtr rifle, 1 airborne	(6) Cat. I
Non Soviet (Eastern Europe)	53 Divisions		(31) Cat. I (11) Cat. II (9) Cat. III ²³

Disregarding category two and three units, the numbers remaining are still impressive. The Soviet forces in Eastern Europe plus the non-Soviet divisions cumulatively can match the unit strength of all NATO forces without evaluating their levels of serviceability. It is this force which will immediately face the NATO Alliance and provide the greatest source of adversity. In examining the strength of the NATO Alliance, one finds many disparities, regardless of the area in which one might wish to make a comparison between these two forces:

NATO ALLIANCE²⁴

<u>Location</u>	<u>Total Number</u>	<u>Conscripts</u>	<u>Reserves</u>	<u>Military</u>
Belgium	89,000	24,600	137,500	16,000
Britain	343,646	none	200,000	10,000
Canada	79,497	none	20,000	3,000
Denmark	32,600	11,000	95,000	—
German Federal Republic	495,000	225,000	750,000	—
Greece	193,500	150,000	400,000	34,000
Italy	366,000	239,300	740,000	84,500
Luxembourg	690	none	—	450
Netherlands	102,000	49,300	171,000	8,400
Norway	37,000	26,500	162,000	—

Portugal	70,926	18,000	—	38,000
Turkey	569,000	485,000	425,000	120,000
United States	<u>2,849,100</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>782,300</u>	<u>45,000</u>
	4,429,259	1,228,700	3,882,800	359,350 ²⁴
	(28%—Total force)			

Beyond the basic element of the individual soldier, there are limitless categories of comparison which all point to an advantage for the Warsaw Pact forces and a disadvantage for the NATO Alliance. Ratios of every porportion show parity or superiority in favor of the USSR.

The only area that can provide even a slight advantage is the comparison between Warsaw Pact and NATO Alliance conscripts. Soviet conscripts rotate in the spring and fall of each year which results in a twelve and one half percent turnover of Soviet forces every six months. Fifty one percent of the Soviet force is conscripts while only twenty-eight percent of the NATO Alliance relies on conscription. Although the inference is minor. Seventy-two percent of the force that is in NATO, is there because they want to be. One must keep in mind that the bulk of the volunteers are from the US, UK, and Canada.

Even though the Warsaw Pact Reserve is awesome, the cumulative population of the NATO Alliance is greater than its advisory and gives it the capability to create a greater conventional force.

Again, numbers of themselves are insignificant, they only allow calculative manipulation which can never address that which can only be experienced through reality. A minority force will always strive to develop equalizers or force multipliers to bolster morale and depreciate the impossibility of an overwhelming threat. The following ratios help

to further illuminate the strength of the USSR.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Warsaw</u>	<u>NATO</u>
Manpower	1.1	1
Divisions	2	1
Aircraft		
Close Spt.	1	1.3
Interceptors	5.1	1
Reconnaissance	2	1
Helicopters	1	1
Tanks	2.4	1
Ships	1.3	1
Total metric tonnage	1	2.3
Surface Combatants	1	1.7
General Purpose Submarines	1.1	1
Anti-Tank Guided Weapons	1	2
Artillery and Rocket Launchers	2	1
Armored Fighting Vehicles	2	1
Surface-to-air Missiles	7	125

The list of items could go on endlessly, however, as in personnel strength, the results are always the same, overwhelming Warsaw Pact superiority.

The Military Commitment

History has consistently shown the United States playing the role of a leader and benefactor. True to tradition, this image was again portrayed on 4 April 1949. Thirteen European nations had found themselves faced by a threat which demanded immediate defensive steps. They petitioned the United States and Canada to participate in forming a coalition which would, individually or collectively, allow them to defend against the possibility of an attack. From this common need evolved, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. (NATO)

Throughout the Treaty there are specific precepts which attest to the significance of the US commitment to NATO. Within the preamble is found:

The parties of this treaty . . . are determined to safeguard

the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples . . . are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

Additional concrete commitments can be found within the Alliance articles:

Article 2 - They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3 - . . . separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4 - The parties will consult . . . whenever the territorial integrity, political independence or security of the parties is threatened.

Article 5 - The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.²⁶

The previous documentation provides more than enough narrative to substantiate the military commitment of the United States to NATO, however, the opinion as to if there is a commitment by all parties involved, is a sharply divided question. There are a multitude of divergences with respect to the political, economic and military interests and perceptions. It is extremely difficult to capsule their content, however, the bottom line of the dialogue shows a continuous US-NATO enhancement. Regardless of the numerous positive exchanges which take place on a daily basis, it is the negative minority which is frequently featured in the headlines of the leading newspapers. Regardless of how anyone views this controversial subject, the Europe of today, from the Iberian Peninsula to the Iran curtain, is more democratically governed than at any time in the history of the western civilization. Much of the success story of NATO must be attributed to the level of commitment by the US. Perhaps it is time to reverse our steps back to the 4 April

1949 meeting to reexamine the resolve which created that alliance.

Perhaps it is appropriate to reacquaint today's society in an open forum with the factual data which makes its existence so important.

A continuous sense of direction must be provided for the American and European public. Europe is America's first line of defense, our second line is a broad expanse of water, beyond that, the US is extremely vulnerable.

Additionally, the 383,000 service personnel, 400,000 military dependents and 600,000 US civilian employees and independent citizens in Europe constitute a sizeable national population, not to mention the considerable European economic investments. But probably just as important as the previous reasons, America's heritage is permanently tied to the roots of Europe. The commitment to Europe, is alive and well. The US would never concede the fall of Europe. Our determination to reverse a similar decision in World War II played a dramatic role in preserving the freedom that Western Europe is presently experiencing. The only possibility of a short war taking place in Europe is that it would be a NATO advantage to terminate it.

Military Conclusions

1. The US and the USSR possess a nuclear parity.
2. The US and the USSR possess the nuclear "sufficiency" to destroy each other.
3. The Soviet European military force has superiority in numbers over the NATO alliance in all conventional categories of significance.

With these "given" elements, the prognosis for a short war, protracted war scenario becomes a question of academics.

The nuclear question in Europe would be viewed by many as a stalemate, however, for a country which has been held in check by nuclear deterrence for the past thirty years, a stalemate for the USSR is a dramatic improvement in game strategy. By elevating the nuclear threshold to the degree that none can accept the consequences of nuclear destruction and the danger of an escalation which could create that destruction, the elements of conventional confrontation become more pronounced.

Deterrence has proved to be the primary source of stabilization in Europe. Deterrence will continue to fulfill that role if the following military objectives can be realized:

a. A conventional parity must be created which is commensurate with the Warsaw Pact in every area of significant importance. The possibility of a nuclear parity creating enough political blackmail to cloud its use for deterrence is an element which cannot be overlooked. If the Soviet forces were to even detect this possibility, they would capitalize on it immediately.

b. Chemical weapons and appropriate antedotes for Soviet chemicals must be developed. 1.3 million lives were lost in World War I due to the use of chemicals. The element which precluded their use in World War II was the deterrence that if one side used them, the other side would retaliate in kind. Soviet threats must be met at all levels.

c. The Pershing Two, Trident, Ground Launched Cruise Missile, MX and Stealth weaponry must be completed in a minimum amount of time. Failure to refurbish any leg of the TRIAD would dramatically reduce the level of NATO's flexible response policy plus extend the "window of vulnerability."

d. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) must meet on a more frequent basis. Dialogue cannot be tied to world events or emotional crisis. Firm, but productive, exchanges of understanding must persist if this nuclear dilemma is ever to be resolved. This particular conclusion can only be effected if items "a through c" above become a firm commitment by each NATO member.

There are those who would choose no first strike, freeze, and immediate arms reduction as alternatives, however, deterrence is the only practical, rational solution. Those who choose this technique do not choose something less than the highest form of rational value; they choose the only state of development which human beings can rationally choose. "It is not better to be red than dead," it is without exception, better, to be neither.²⁷

One can only measure success from past experience, nuclear deterrence has formulated a level of peace seldom experienced by the European nations. Obviously, nuclear affects create scenarios which are sickening to even the most neurotic, diabolic mind, and it is this type of deterrence that produces the level of moral thinking desired, to the audience desired, the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER IV

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CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

In analyzing the previous chapters and reviewing the conclusions, one cannot help but feel a sense of uneasiness, since the question "will there be a war" or "won't there be a war" hasn't been answered. The scenario dependent nature of this question precludes a clear cut answer, but much food for thought has surfaced. Can the US continue to look the other direction, bite its tongue and wring its hands? Must not the United States return to the "detente" technique in which during a time of "relaxation," the Soviets launched a massive military buildup, dramatically expanded its political influence by reinforcing leftist forces throughout the world, while increasing their economic and commercial ties with Western Europe. These stinging US losses are the prices paid for a fragmented and inconsistent foreign policy.

The US cannot ignore the fact that the USSR has one of the richest mineral supplies in the world? Or that the Soviets have the second largest global coal reserves, the third largest natural gas reserves, and the second largest crude oil reserves. The acknowledgement of this wealth of natural resources reveals the greatest danger of all, the immense inner strength of Soviet strategic reserves. Since the resources are there, why haven't they capitalized

on them? The answer can be assumed to be that the NATO capabilities are perceived by the USSR as an unacceptable risk in a hostile confrontation.

It is to this assumption that our recommendations are directed:

1. Economics. The area of economics is the only decisive area that the "present" Soviet Union will never be able to match. However, one specific illusion must be diminished. When the Germans build a better diesel engine, that's competition; when the Japanese create a stronger steel, that's free enterprise; but when the Soviets create a better SS-20, "that's an element of war." This severe competition must be met at all levels across a broad spectrum of economic ingenuity. When Chevrolet creates a high mileage carburetor, no one is surprised when Ford or Dodge develops a similar product. It is this type of competition that must be induced, and it is this type of dialogue that will rapidly widen the US-USSR technological gap. The USSR knows this will be a race that they can't win. Initially, there may be an aggressive arms race. But if the Soviets are planning war, the US and NATO will at least be in a position to compete. If the Soviets are not planning war, they will be more receptive to arms reduction. NATO has the capability to win a protracted economic war, but only if a viable military deterrence is in evidence. A combined, well structured, NATO effort of 4% of their consolidated GNP would be greater than the annual 11 to 14% of the Soviet GNP.

Economics are driven by politics and reinforced by military deterrence. Carl von Clausewitz best summarizes this entire recommendation when he states,

Today armies are so much alike in weapons, training, and equipment that there is little difference in such matters between the best and the worst of them. Education may still

make a considerable difference between technical corps, but what it usually comes down to is one side invents improvements and first puts them to use, and the other side promptly copies them.¹

The most important aspect is for the NATO Alliance to perfect the technology and let the USSR "promptly copy," plus intice them into keeping up with NATO. Unfortunately, the inverse of this premise is presently true in the military arena.

Economic ventures are strongly in NATO's favor, only the will of NATO will determine its true strength.

NATO is in a protracted economic confrontation with the USSR, only the will of the NATO citizens can determine if it will be a decisive victory.

2. Political. When the question is asked is NATO in greater danger from political disagreement than at any other time, the most frequent answer has been yes. The reason is the loss of nuclear superiority, an item that will likely never really be enjoyed by a single nation again. Since the nuclear question is of paramount importance, it must be addressed from a point of view of managing the possible as opposed to wishing for the impossible. What is possible is the ultimate placement of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. It will require strategic diplomacy to accomplish this. It may require positioning by European leaders to show the advantage to Western Europe, but the Intermediate Nuclear Force is a necessary contribution to deterrence credibility. Missile placement is the short range goal and possibly key to sustaining peace while allied conventional capabilities are strengthened for future deterrence credibility. The next critical ingredient to assist in achieving a nuclear deterrence is the continuation of arms reduction talks. This will be an encouraging

sign to Europe and all dialog between the USSR and the United States must continue. Nuclear sufficiency must be reduced on both sides to controllable and variable levels.

The US must insure that any future economic accommodations and objectives are tied to political appeasements by the USSR. Technology exchanges to encourage Arms Reduction Talks and threatened sanctions to guard against Soviet use of military power are examples of economic measure with political implementations.

NATO will suffer deterioration and further loss of credibility if the status quo is maintained. Progress is not easy, especially when dealing with independent democratic governments. At times like these one must remember the words of Winston Churchill who stated, "the only thing worse than fighting with the allies is fighting without them."² This is true in today's environment and the importance of NATO survival is undiminished.

A quotation from Clausewitz adamantly summarized the political role of war as "the purpose of bidding for time is to await political changes, such as the enemy's wearying of his effort, or of allies adhering to one's own side or departing that of the enemy."³

A strong NATO Alliance will win the present protracted political conflict plus preclude the need for a military confrontation of any duration.

3. Military. The established military threat is conclusively a Soviet advantage. With an acknowledged nuclear parity and an overwhelming conventional superiority, the Soviets have a marked numerical advantage. Yet, it is the opinion of the authors that the USSR will not exercise this military advantage "in Europe." Influenced by historical events from the past, these incidents appear to be the most tangible

sources of evidence for the future. In 1955, President Eisenhower's Cabinet predicted imminent war with Red China in the Formosa Strait. President Eisenhower knew better: "I have so often been through these periods of strain that I have become accustomed to the fact that most of the calamities that we anticipate really never occur."⁴

The strategic minds that could have predicted a confrontation between the United Kingdom and Argentina are extremely rare. However, there is one common strand that should have raised some eyebrows and concern. The USSR has been Argentina's leading trading partner since 1979. It should come as no surprise that arms are now being offered by the USSR to Argentina. The next step can only lead to a multitude of possible scenarios which can only further depreciate the North-South relationships.

It is this type of activity which drives the military recommendations which are closely intertwined with the economic and political recommendations.

The NATO alliance must participate uniformly in a strong military deterrence program.

Nils Gylden of the Swedish Defense Secretariat stated it best when he said, "Western Europe has the capability to balance the USSR on its own."⁵ If the West Europeans can mutually carry their fair share of the burden, then it leaves the US the opportunity to enforce a policy of containment. Andrei Amalrik, a Soviet dissident, further compliments the need for deterrence when he stated, "Were it not for nuclear arms, a war between the Soviet Union and the West would have started and ended long ago, only God knows."⁶ Without exception every office, institute, and individual interviewed, during the author's recent international

trip, pointed out the need for deterrence. Deterrence must be at all levels. Colonel Sharpe, U.K., Plans and Policy Division SHAPE, put this situation in perspective when he stated, "For 30 out of 35 years, Europe was linked to a superior power and the credible deterrence that made it so. Because of this change, NATO cannot maintain the status quo forever."⁷ NATO must create a deterrence at all levels of possible military confrontation; conventional, chemical mechanical or nuclear. Between now and 1990, NATO will close its window of vulnerability. Between now and that date, Western Europe, will be extremely vulnerable. A credible deterrence is the only dynamic which will preclude the USSR from taking advantage of this situation.

Carl von Clausewitz best puts this entire recommendation into perspective when he states, "When the time for action comes, the first requirement should be that all the parts must act."⁸ Continual deterrence and containment must be a major platform in the US and NATO defensive format of the future. A short war by the USSR complemented by surprise would be a decisive advantage for the USSR prior to 1990. Profound vigilance and a profound determination complemented by a strong deterrence will continue to provide the stability in Western Europe that has existed for the past 30 years plus depreciate the possibility of a military confrontation in the European Theater.

However, the present economic and political war will continue at its present rate. The super powers will continue to cross swords until a major change in ideology takes place. A major change that would affect the vitality of the Soviet citizens will not take place in the foreseeable future.

The role of the U.S. in Europe will continue to emphasize strategic diplomacy designed to provide a strong nuclear and conventional deter-

rence. Economically, the U.S. must reinforce the West European economy by reducing monetary threats through increased trade relations and a favorable exchange of credits.

CHAPTER V

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Item 20 continued.

Stockholm; and with US diplomats and Swedish government officials in Stockholm. Academicians and military officials at the USAWC were also queried. An analysis was made of the possibilities of a short war or a protracted war within Western Europe. The question as to whether the Soviets will attack and the "better moment" when they might attack is also addressed. The driving political issues plus the economic factors which may lead to a military confrontation in Western Europe are also presented.

The Soviet government is currently beset with uncertainty as to which domestic and foreign policy options to choose. The US must strive for a sound NATO Alliance which can continue to deter the USSR. Containment must become a co-equal to NATO's policy of "flexible response."

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